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INTRODUCTION 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens 
to confess by word or act their faith therein.1 
Justice Jackson stated these powerful words in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette.2  From 1943, when these words were 
written, until today, individuals still carry the constitutional freedom to 
exercise or omit from exercising certain beliefs or faiths.3  Recently, 
however, the First Amendment free exercise right has been so vigorously 
asserted that it is clashing with individuals’ equal protection rights.4  An 
example of this tension occurred in the Supreme Court decision, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.5 
Following this decision, several states, including Texas, celebrated 
religious freedom and interpreted the holding to allow a stronger religious 
presence in the State.6  This religious “victory” has implications on 
various laws—including Texas’s House Bill 3859 (Texas’s Adoption 
Bill).7  This Bill, which is now law, allows adoption agencies in Texas to 
refuse services to certain individuals because of the agency’s “sincerely 
held religious beliefs.”8 
When analyzing the reasoning behind Masterpiece Cakeshop, coupled 
with current constitutional protections, it is apparent that religious refusal 
 
1. W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
2. Id. 
3. See generally U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion].”). 
4. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–
24 (2018) (holding that an individual could refuse to design a cake for a same-sex couple because 
his cake design was considered “speech” and, as such, constitutionally protected under the First 
Amendment). 
5. Id. 
6. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Cruz Issues Statement in Response to Supreme Court 
Decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n (June 4, 2018), https://www.cruz. 
senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=3859 [https://perma.cc/BX67-UV4L] [hereinafter Senator Cruz 
Statement] (including Senator Ted Cruz’s celebratory messages following the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop decision). 
7. See generally H.B. 3859, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (perpetuating a trend within 
Texas and religiously infused laws). 
8. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010.  
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laws—such as Texas’s Adoption Bill—are unconstitutional for several 
reasons.9  This Comment will delve into the aftermath of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and how the decision affects Texas’s Adoption Bill.10  Part I  
provides a brief history on religious refusals under Supreme Court 
precedent and in Texas specifically.11  Part II then isolates Texas’s 
Adoption Bill and describes each of its constitutional violations—
including the Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and Equal 
Protection Clause.12  Part III focuses on the relationship between Texas’s 
Adoption Bill and the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision.13  Namely, the 
section sheds light on how the Supreme Court decision does not support 
religious refusal laws similar to Texas’s Adoption Bill, despite allowing 
a baker to refuse to bake a cake for a same-sex couple’s wedding 
celebration, as it was contrary to his religious beliefs.14  This Comment 
concludes by demanding that Texas’s Adoption Bill be struck down as 
unconstitutional.15 
 
9. See id. (prohibiting certain groups of people from adopting children or from being 
adopted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the establishment of religion in governmental 
institutions); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1971) (defining the parameters of how 
far religion can permissibly be involved in state or government action). 
10. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing religion to contribute to an 
adoption agency’s decision to accept or refuse an application); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1720–22 (allowing a baker to refuse to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex 
couple).  
11. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (describing how the legitimate 
government interest in compulsory education overrides Amish religious practices); see also 
Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 724 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 2013) (describing a Texas case dealing 
with religious freedom). 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I; TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010. 
13. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010; Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct.  
at 1720–22. 
14. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010; see Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. 
Ct. at 1723 (allowing a man’s religious beliefs to be used as a premise for refusing to bake a cake 
for a same-sex couple because the cake was considered to be a form of speech).  
15. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (describing the protections that citizens are provided 
under the First Amendment of the Constitution), with Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct.  
at 1719 (expanding the scope of the First Amendment in an effort to allow a baker to refuse to 
provide services to a gay couple due to the baker’s religious beliefs), and TEX. HUM. RES. CODE 
ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing adoption agencies to refuse to provide services based on their First 
Amendment free exercise of religion rights). 
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I.    A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS REFUSALS 
A. The Supreme Court’s Modern Approach on Religious Refusals  
The Supreme Court of the United States recently examined “religious 
refusals” in the context of a baker who refused to bake a wedding cake 
for a same-sex marriage, as his religious beliefs opposed it.16  
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. (the Bakery), is a Colorado bakery owned by 
Jack Phillips (Phillips).17  Phillips was known for being a skilled baker, 
as well as a devout Christian.18  Phillips explains his “main goal in life 
is to be obedient to Jesus Christ and Christ’s teachings in all aspects of 
his life” and he seeks to “honor God through his work at Masterpiece 
Cakeshop.”19  His religious beliefs also urge that “God’s intention for 
marriage from the beginning of history is that it is and should be the union 
of one man and one woman.”20   
In 2012, a same-sex couple, Charlie Craig and David Mullins, visited 
Phillips’ well-known cake shop, the Bakery, to order a cake for their 
wedding.21  Phillips refused their request because of his religious 
opposition to same-sex marriage.22  Specifically, Phillips explained 
“creat[ing] a wedding cake for an event that celebrates something that 
directly goes against the teachings of the Bible, would . . . [be] a personal 
endorsement and participation in the ceremony and relationship that they 
were entering into.”23  Consequently, in September 2012, the couple filed 
a discrimination complaint against the Bakery and Phillips with the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission (Colorado Commission), pursuant to 
the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA).24 
First, the Colorado Commission determined the Bakery’s actions 
violated CADA and sent the case to a State Administrative Law Judge 
 
16. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24. 
17. Id. at 1724. 
18. Id.  
19. Id.  
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 1723. 
22. Id.  
23. Id. at 1724. 
24. See id. at 1725 (describing the couple’s complaint alleging they had been denied “full 
and equal service” at the Bakery because of their sexual orientation); see also COLO. REV. STAT.  
§ 24-34-401 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in a “place of business 
engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services . . . to the public”). 
5
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(ALJ) who ultimately ruled in favor of the couple.25  The Colorado 
Commission further affirmed this decision and ordered Phillips to “cease 
and desist from discriminating against . . . same-sex couples in refusing 
to sell them wedding cakes or any product [they] would sell to 
heterosexual couples.”26  Subsequently, Phillips appealed and the 
Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission’s finding and 
order.27  The Court of Appeals held that Phillips and the Bakery, as a 
whole, violated CADA and requiring him to bake this couple’s cake was 
not a violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion—
as he should create wedding cakes for all customers free of 
discrimination.28  Specifically, the court struck down the baker’s 
argument that his refusal was not because of the couple’s sexual 
orientation, but, rather, opposition to same-sex marriage.29  The court 
ultimately concluded same-sex marriage is almost equivalent to the 
couple’s sexual orientation, and therefore Phillips and the Bakery 
violated CADA when refusing to bake the couple’s cake.30 
Eventually, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the baker’s 
writ of certiorari and examined whether the Colorado Commission’s 
order violated the Constitution.31  The Court analyzed two First 
Amendment freedoms—freedom of speech and free exercise of 
religion.32  In the end, the Court held in favor of the baker and concluded 
that the Colorado Commission violated the baker’s free exercise rights.33  
 
25. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1725–26 (describing the investigator’s 
findings that “on multiple occasions, [Phillips] turned away potential customers on the basis of their 
sexual orientation.”); see also Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276–77 (Colo. 
App. 2015) (showing the ALJ’s determination that Phillips’ actions constituted prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and not mere opposition to same-sex marriage). 
26. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1726. 
27. Craig, 370 P.3d at 294–95. 
28. Id. at 294; see U.S. CONST. amend I (stating “Congress shall make no law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]”). 
29. Craig, 370 P.3d at 279. 
30. Id. at 281. 
31. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
32. Id. at 1726; see U.S. CONST. amend I (stating “Congress shall make no law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . . . or abridging the freedom of speech”). 
33. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1732. 
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Rather than solely focusing on the baker’s free exercise rights, the Court 
added a freedom of speech component to its analysis.34   
The Supreme Court also held that the Colorado Commission was 
attacking Phillips’ individual beliefs and, therefore, was not allowing 
Colorado to be religiously “neutral”—as the Free Exercise Clause 
requires.35  In the end, the Court concluded the outcome of the case “must 
await further elaboration in the courts.”36  In his opinion, Justice 
Kennedy recognized this “further elaboration” and stated that these 
disputes must be handled “with tolerance, without undue disrespect to 
sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities 
when they seek goods and services in an open market.”37 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Court’s “general rule 
that [religious and philosophical] objections do not allow business 
owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected 
persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally 
applicable public accommodations law.”38  Although Justice Ginsburg 
agreed with and used the same premise as the Court, she arrived at a 
different conclusion.39  In her argument, Justice Ginsburg distinguishes 
several cases from Phillips’ to show how the Court reached the wrong 
decision.40   
Specifically, the cases Justice Ginsburg focus on revolve around a man 
named William Jack (Jack) who wished to get cakes containing religious 
and hateful messages.41  Jack went to three bakeries, attempting to get a 
cake in the shape of a Bible, with an image of two men holding hands 
covered by a red “X” and several Bible verses denouncing 
homosexuality.42  Justice Ginsburg agrees that these bakeries should 
 
34. See id. at 1728 (finding Phillips’ artistic skills in making cakes constitute “speech” 
because they endorse his own voice and creativity). 
35. See id. at 1729 (highlighting several moments of the Colorado Commission’s public 
hearings where the Court believed members showed hostility toward any sincere religious beliefs 
in the public sphere). 
36. Id. at 1732. 
37. Id.  
38. Id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
39. Id.  
40. Id. at 1749–52.  
41. Id. at 1749. 
42. See id. (“On one cake, he requested [on] one side[,] . . . ‘God hates sin. Psalm 45:7’ and 
on the opposite side of the cake ‘Homosexuality is a detestable sin. Leviticus 18:2.’ On the second 
cake, [the one] with the image of the two groomsmen covered by a red ‘X’ [Jack] requested [these 
7
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have refused to bake cakes for Jack—not because of their religious 
opposition to it, but because the messages Jack wished to put on the cakes 
were hateful.43   
These bakeries treated Jack in the same manner as other individuals 
who wished to get cakes with hateful messages.44  Conversely, Phillips 
did not refuse to bake a cake for David Mullins and Charlie Craig because 
of “hateful messages,” but rather, because they were gay and wishing to 
participate in a same-sex marriage.45  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
highlights the majority opinion’s mistaking religious opposition for clear 
discrimination—a risk that will always prevail when allowing religious 
refusals.46 
B. Texas’s Approach on Religious Refusals 
Following the Masterpiece Cakeshop Supreme Court decision,  United 
States Senator Ted Cruz found the case to be a victory and urged: 
Today, the Supreme Court took a stand for religious liberty against the 
unconstitutional demands of an oppressive bureaucracy. The decision’s 
wide 7-2 margin shows that justices recognize what millions of Americans 
have known since the first Constitutional Convention: whether a baker, a 
teacher, a doctor, or clergy, the government may not force any American 
to violate his sincerely held religious beliefs. I look forward to the day 
when the First Amendment rights of all Americans are recognized and 
reaffirmed at the Supreme Court and in every statehouse across the 
nation.47 
 
words]: ‘God loves sinners’ and on the other side ‘While we were yet sinners Christ died for us. 
Romans 5:8.’”). 
43. Id. at 1750. 
44. See id. (“[T]he bakers would have refused to make a cake with Jack’s requested message 
for any customer, regardless of his or her religion.”). 
45. See id. (“The bakeries’ refusal to make Jack cakes of a kind they would not make for 
any customer scarcely resembles Phillips’ refusal to serve Craig and Mullins: Phillips would not 
sell to Craig and Mullins, for no reason other than their sexual orientation, a cake of the kind he 
regularly sold to others.”). 
46. See id. at 1750–51 (distinguishing the notion of declining to provide services because 
of “offensive” messages from declining to provide services because an individual’s beliefs do not 
coincide with another’s beliefs). 
47. Senator Cruz Statement, supra note 6; see id. at 1732 (using several different First 
Amendment protections to hold that a baker could deny baking a wedding cake for a same-sex 
couple).  
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1. Texas’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act  
Texas is unique because it has had its own religious freedom law since 
1999.48  This law—the Texas Religious Freedom and Restoration Act 
(RFRA)—provides a government agency may not substantially burden a 
person’s free exercise of religion.49  Further, in order for a “burdening 
act” to stand up to this law, it must prove the burden is in furtherance of 
a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that interest.50  Several Supreme Court decisions and a very 
similar federal RFRA, support Texas’s RFRA and provide the same 
stringent strict scrutiny standard.51  Notably, when President Bill Clinton 
passed the Federal RFRA in 1993, the Act stated  one of its purposes was 
to “restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner52 . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder53 . . . and to guarantee its 
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened.”54  This alone provides potential dangers for “excessive 




48. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 110.003 (describing the religion freedom law 
Texas has enacted). 
49. Id. § 110.003(a); see Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 724 F.3d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 
2013) (indicating that strict compliance was necessary under the Texas RFRA). 
50. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 110.003(b); Morgan, 724 F.3d at 582. 
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1993) (using the same compelling interest test set forth 
in prior federal court rulings); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–
91 (2014) (holding that the RFRA did not allow the Department of Health and Human Services to 
require corporations to provide health insurance coverage for contraceptives which were contrary 
to companies’ sincerely, held religious beliefs); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236 (finding Wisconsin’s 
compulsory school attendance law to be unduly burdensome to the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment because it forced Amish parents to send their children to public school after the eighth 
grade—infringing on core Amish religious beliefs); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) 
(concluding that denying unemployment benefits to an individual who could not work on a certain 
day because of her religious beliefs imposed a burden on the individual’s free exercise of religion 
and, thus, was unconstitutional). 
52. 374 U.S. at 406. 
53. 406 U.S. at 235–36. 
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1993) (reiterating the need for strict scrutiny in free 
exercise challenges); see also id. at 234 (finding compulsory education to the Amish to not be  
“so compelling that even [their] established religious practices must give way”); Sherbert, 374 U.S. 
at 403 (requiring any incidental burden on an individual’s free exercise of religion to be justified 
by a “compelling state interest”). 
9
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and Supreme Court precedent prohibit.55 
Several cases have illustrated these dangers and expanded the breadth 
of the RFRA.56  For example, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
Hobby Lobby Corporation challenged the 2010 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s preventative health services because Hobby 
Lobby argued it was violative of the RFRA.57  Specifically, Hobby 
Lobby argued that requiring it to offer access to certain contraceptive 
drugs to its employees was contrary to its sincerely held religious 
beliefs.58  In response, the government used the language of the RFRA 
to argue the mandate served a compelling governmental interest because 
it ensured all women have access to United States Food and Drug 
Administration-approved methods of contraceptives.59  Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court held for Hobby Lobby—stating that providing access to 
contraceptives did constitute a compelling governmental interest, but the 
mandate did not meet the RFRA’s “least restrictive means” 
requirement.60  This case is responsible for extending RFRA protections 
to corporations and demonstrates how difficult it is for any law or act to 
survive a RFRA challenge.61 
Notably, Texas’s RFRA is still in place and has encouraged many 
RFRA-related laws to make their way into the State—allowing 
individuals and entities to refuse to provide goods or services to others 
merely because of their “sincerely held religious beliefs.”62  Prior to the 
 
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the establishment of religion in governmental or 
state institutions); see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (creating a test which asks whether a statute 
in dispute fosters “excessive government entanglement with religion”). 
56. See, e.g., Burwell, 573 U.S. at 688–90 (using the RFRA as a basis to use religion to 
challenge the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s preventative health services). 
57. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2010) (requiring employers to provide health insurance 
to their employees and also provide “additional preventative care” for women). 
58. Burwell, 573 U.S. at 683. 
59. See id. at 727 (holding that individuals have a constitutional right to obtain 
contraceptives). 
60. Id. at 736. 
61. See id. (permitting a corporation to use the RFRA as a basis to use religion to overcome 
a government act). 
62. See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.004(1), 45.005(a) (allowing child welfare 
agencies to permit providers to refuse to place a child with, or in the guardianship and care of, a 
child welfare service if it conflicts with the provider’s “sincerely held religious beliefs”); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 2.601 (allowing clergy or any staff member of a religious institution to refuse services 
to a marriage if that action violates their organization’s or individual’s “sincerely held religious 
belief”). 
10
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passage of Texas’s RFRA, a Texas case challenged the Federal RFRA.63  
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Archbishop of San Antonio argued local 
zoning authorities denying a church a building permit violated Texas’s 
RFRA, as it imposed a substantial burden on his exercise of religion 
without having a compelling state interest.64  Although not all RFRA-
related legislation became law, one very controversial bill did pass and 
still remains in place.65 
2. Texas’s Adoption Bill 
During the 2017 legislative session, one of the RFRA bills discussed 
above became law—Texas’s Adoption Bill.66  This Bill allows child 
welfare organizations, including adoption and foster agencies, to turn 
away qualified parents who are seeking to care for a child in need.67  
These parents include LGBTQ+ couples; interfaith couples; single 
parents; married couples where one prospective parent has been 
previously divorced; or any other prospective parent to whom the agency 
has any type of religious objection against.68  Additionally, Texas’s 
Adoption Bill harms children because it allows adoption agencies to 
refuse to provide services to children in care if the agency has any 
religious objection to that service.69 
The Adoption Bill states its legislative intent is: 
 
63. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (striking down the Federal RFRA 
as it applied to the states because the Court held that it was an unconstitutional use of the 
enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
64. Id. at 512. 
65. See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (illustrating an example of RFRA-
related legislation in Texas). 
66. Id. §§ 45.001–.010. 
67. Id. § 45.004(1). 
68. See Nick Morrow, BREAKING: Discrimination Signed Into Law in Texas, Governor 
Abbott Signs HB 3859, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (June 14, 2017), https://www.hrc.org/blog/Texas-
Gov-signed-HB-3859-into-law [https://perma.cc/D2PB-T3WW] (outlining the numerous dangers 
that Texas’s Adoption Bill will bring to a variety of communities); see generally TEX. HUM. RES. 
CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (providing protection to agencies and failing to provide any protections 
to individuals). 
69. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a) (“A child welfare services provider may 
not be required to provide any service that conflicts with the provider’s sincerely held religious 
beliefs.”); see also Morrow, supra note 68 (urging that Texas’s Adoption Bill not only harms 
prospective parents who want to adopt, but also harms children who belong to a class that the 
agency does not agree with). 
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[T]o maintain a diverse network of service providers that offer a range of 
foster capacity options and that can accommodate children from various 
cultural backgrounds. To that end, we expect reasonable accommodations 
to be made by the state to allow people of diverse backgrounds and beliefs 
to be part of meeting the needs of children in the child welfare system.70 
However, the effects of the Bill are far from the intent provided 
above.71  For example, in M.D. v. Abbott, Janis Jack, a United States 
District Judge for the Southern District of Texas in Corpus Christi, held 
that Texas violated foster children’s’ constitutional rights by exposing 
them to an unreasonable risk of harm in a system where children “often 
age out of care more damaged than when they entered.”72  Moreover, 
Judge Janis Jack contended this abuse from the Texas foster system has 
created a “population that cannot contribute to society, and proves a 
continued strain on the government through welfare, incarceration, or 
otherwise.”73  This alone shows the need for reform and improvement in 
the Texas foster system.74  Now, Texas’s Adoption Bill makes it even 
less likely that these foster children will receive adequate care through 
the foster care system or adoption.75 
II.    THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TEXAS’S ADOPTION BILL 
A. Texas’s Adoption Bill Violates the Establishment Clause by Allowing 
State Funds to be Used to Compel Foster Children Into Religious 
Entities and by Supporting Religion and Not Secular Beliefs 
Texas’s Adoption Bill is problematic in many ways.  One of its most 
troublesome characteristics is that it violates the First Amendment’s 
 
70. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.001. 
71. See Kristopher Sharp, The Deadly Consequences of Texas’ HB 3859, TEX. TRIB.,  
(June 23, 2017), https://www.tribtalk.org/2017/06/23/the-deadly-consequences-of-texas-hb-3859/ 
[https://perma.cc/3W2K-WH7G] (providing many reasons why Texas’s Adoption Bill will 
continue the “cycle of abuse” in the Texas foster care system). 
72. 152 F. Supp. 3d 684, 823 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
73. M.D. v. Abbott, 152 F. Supp. 3d 684, 823 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
74. See Sharp, supra note 71 (recalling the horrors the author endured while being a child 
in the Texas foster care system). 
75. See id. (recognizing the consequences that Texas’s Adoption Bill will have—forcing 
children to spend their childhoods in facilities and being cared for by rotating staff rather than by 
loving families). 
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Establishment Clause.76  The Establishment Clause states: “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof.”77  When analyzing the Establishment Clause 
in any given situation, a discussion of Lemon v. Kurtzman is necessary.78  
In Lemon, the Supreme Court examined two statutes—one in 
Pennsylvania and one in Rhode Island.79  On the one hand, the 
Pennsylvania statute provided financial support to nonpublic elementary 
and secondary schools by reimbursing the cost of teachers’ salaries, 
textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects.80  On 
the other hand, the Rhode Island statute enabled the state to directly pay 
the teachers in nonpublic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of 
their annual salary.81  Both statutes, however, authorized state funding 
for church-related educational institutions.82 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that both statutes were 
unconstitutional.83  The Pennsylvania statute was facially 
unconstitutional because it allowed for state financial aid to be provided 
directly to church-related schools.84  The Rhode Island statute fostered 
excessive entanglement between government and religion because the 
program required the government to examine a school’s records to 
determine how much of the total expenditures was attributable to secular 
education and how much was attributable to religious activity.85  In the 
Court’s discussion, Justice Burger urged: 
The language of the Religion Clause of the First Amendment is at best 
opaque, particularly when compared with other portions of the 
Amendment.  Its authors did not simply prohibit the establishment of a 
 
76. U.S. CONST. amend I; see generally TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 
(explaining how religious beliefs of a child welfare provider are protected even if that means 
entangling church and state).  
77. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
78. See 403 U.S. at 602 (analyzing the circumstances of when a governmental provision is 
impermissibly entangled with religion).  
79. Id. at 606–07. 
80. Id.; 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5601. 
81. 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 (repealed); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607. 
82. 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5601; 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 (repealed); Lemon, 403 
U.S. at 607. 
83. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607. 
84. Id. at 621–22; 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5601.  
85. 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 (repealed); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620. 
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state church or a state religion, an area history shows they regarded as very 
important and fraught with great dangers.  Instead they commanded that 
there should be “no law respecting an establishment of religion.”86 
Notably, the Court moved to elaborate on how many laws “respect” 
the establishment of religion without recognizing or realizing it.87  These 
laws may not necessarily “establish” religion, but still “respect” 
religion—and, therefore, are unconstitutional.88  Because of the 
difficulty in identifying violations of the Establishment Clause, the 
Supreme Court created a three-part test in Lemon.89  The tests states that 
if a statute (1) has a secular legislative purpose, (2) has a principal or 
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) does not 
foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion,” then it does 
not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.90 
1. Texas’s Adoption Bill Does Not Pass the Well-Settled Lemon Test 
Texas’s Adoption Bill does not pass the Lemon test referenced 
above.91  Under the first part of the test, we must determine whether 
Texas’s Adoption Bill has a secular legislative purpose.92  Section 
45.001 of the Bill states: 
[i]t is the intent of the legislature to maintain a diverse network of service 
providers that offer a range of foster capacity options and that can 
accommodate children from various cultural backgrounds.  To that end, we 
expect reasonable accommodations to be made by the state to allow people 
 
86. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
87. See id. (“A law may be one ‘respecting’ the forbidden objective while falling short of 
its total realization.”).   
88. See id. (recognizing the difficulty in determining whether a statute violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); see also Establish, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019) (defining “establish” as “to settle, make, or fix firmly; to enact permanently”). 
89. See 403 U.S. at 612–13 (creating a test to determine the constitutionality of a statute 
concerning religion); see also Robert L. Kilroy, A Lost Opportunity to Sweeten the Lemon of 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the 
University of Virginia, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 701, 705 (1997) (providing a detailed 
examination of the Lemon test).  
90. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. 
91. See id. (providing guidance on when a statute is constitutional under the First 
Amendment); see also TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (showing how the government 
has allowed entanglement with religion through this provision). 
92. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (detailing the way in which the first prong of the Lemon 
test involves an examination of whether the statute has a secular legislative purpose). 
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of diverse backgrounds and beliefs to be part of meeting the needs of 
children in the child welfare system.93 
When reading the legislative intent on its own, it appears to be secular 
and does not promote any religious beliefs.94  Allegedly, the legislature’s 
intent in enacting Texas’s Adoption Bill was to promote diversity and 
accommodate children from various cultural backgrounds.95  From the 
text alone, there is no basis to support a conclusion the legislative intent 
was to advance religion.96  Thus, Texas’s Adoption Bill passes the first 
part of the Lemon test.97 
However, the Lemon test requires the statute to meet all three parts, not 
just one.98  The second part of the Lemon test requires the statute to have 
a principal or primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits 
religion.99  Texas’s Adoption Bill does not pass this part of the test.100  
Here, the foreseeable consequence is foster children will be denied 
placement and services because they: follow a different religion than the 
agency’s; practice no religion; or have any qualities which are against the 
agency’s faith.101   
Texas’s Adoption Bill also allows child welfare service providers to 
use religion as a reason for denying crucial services to foster children in 
need—such as denying a gay child from being adopted merely because 
 
93. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.001. 
94. See id. (alleging the legislative intent to “maintain a diverse network of service 
providers . . . that can accommodate children from various cultural backgrounds”). 
95. See id. (providing the details of the legislature’s intent in enacting Texas’s Adoption 
Bill).  
96. See id. (lacking any encouragement of religion in its “legislative intent” section). 
97. See id. (including a secular legislative intent of promoting diversity for both the children 
and the agencies); see also 403 U.S. at 612 (requiring a statute to have a neutral purpose rather than 
a secular legislative purpose). 
98. See 403 U.S. at 612–13 (emphasizing the importance of meeting both prongs of the 
requisite test). 
99. Id. at 612. 
100. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.001; see id. (providing emphasis on the second part 
of the test and on the consequences of the statute, rather than the statute’s intent); see also Sharp, 
supra note 71 (detailing some of the chilling consequences of Texas’s Adoption Bill and how it 
allows child welfare agencies to claim religious objections to certain groups of individuals). 
101. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.004–.005 (allowing a child welfare agency to 
decline to provide services to foster children if the children’s religious beliefs do not align with the 
child welfare agency’s beliefs). 
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the agency’s “sincere religious beliefs” were against it.102  This certainly 
has an effect that advances religion for the agencies.103  Because the 
Lemon test requires the statute in dispute meet all three elements, Texas’s 
Adoption Bill would fail and be held as violative of the Establishment 
Clause after the analysis of this second part of the test.104 
Even if Texas’s Adoption Bill did not have principle or primary effects 
advancing or inhibiting religion, it would still be held unconstitutional 
because it also does not meet the third part of the Lemon test.105  The 
third part of the test requires that the statute not foster “an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.”106  In Lemon, the Court 
evaluated this by examining the statute’s cumulative impact constituting 
“government entanglement.”107 
In this analysis, the Supreme Court recognizes the difficulty in having 
a complete separation between church and state and knows some 
government entanglement with religion inevitably may exist.108  
However, a rule still exists to determine whether the government 
entanglement is impermissible.109  When determining whether the 
government entanglement is excessive and impermissible, courts 
“examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, 
 
102. See id. § 45.004(1) (permitting child welfare services to “decline . . . to provide, 
facilitate, or refer a person for child welfare services that conflict with, or under circumstances that 
conflict with, the provider’s sincerely held religious beliefs.”); see also Sharp, supra note 71 
(detailing a gay author’s experience as a child in the Texas foster care system). 
103. Cf. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (holding that state reimbursement 
for parents to pay for bus transportation to private religious schools is constitutional because it did 
not only help the religious children, but helped all children). 
104. See 403 U.S. at 612 (stating that a law will be held to be unconstitutional if it does not 
meet all three elements of the test).  
105. See id. at 613 (requiring a statute to both not advance nor inhibit religion and not foster 
government entanglement with religion). 
106. Id.  
107. See id. at 613–14 (“[W]e conclude that the cumulative impact of the entire relationship 
arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government and 
religion.”). 
108. Id. at 614; see Sherbert, 347 U.S. at 422 ((Harlan, J., dissenting) (detailing government 
entanglement with religion in the employment context)); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 
(1952) (elaborating on government entanglement in relation to religious observations at school). 
109. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (specifying the test used to determine whether there is 
excessive government entanglement with religion). 
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the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship 
between the government and the religious authority.”110 
Here, Texas’s Adoption Bill fosters an impermissible degree of 
entanglement for several reasons.111  First, the institutions which are 
benefited are solely the child welfare agencies with strong religious 
beliefs.112  As mentioned earlier, the Adoption Bill’s purpose was to 
promote diversity and inclusion—expressing the intent to benefit the 
children.113  Unfortunately, the actual consequence of the Bill is the 
exact opposite.114  Texas’s Adoption Bill fosters exclusion of certain 
groups of children and harms foster children who are not of the same faith 
as the adoption agency.115  Thus, the little benefit which comes from 
Texas’s Adoption Bill only goes to entities of the same religious 
background—therefore, encouraging government entanglement with 
religion.116   Second, Texas’s Adoption Bill allows the government to use 
state funds to aid one faith.117  One section of the Bill particularly 
triggers this issue.118  Subsection (2) of Section 45.004 states no adverse 
action may be taken against child welfare services providers if it: 
provides or intends to provide children under the control, care, 
guardianship, or direction of the provider with a religious education, 
 
110. Id.  
111. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010; see id. (providing the factors and tests 
to determine if there is impermissible government entanglement).  
112. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.004–.005 (permitting denial of services because 
of any “sincere religious beliefs”). 
113. See id. §§ 45.001–.010 (providing the alleged intent in enacting Texas’s Adoption 
Bill).   
114. See Sharp, supra note 71 (detailing the severe consequences that Texas’s Adoption 
Bill brings to the foster care system and children in Texas); cf. id. (noting that the legislative intent 
and the actual consequences of Texas’s Adoption Bill are different). 
115. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing children of one faith to 
receive benefits and children of other faiths to be left in the foster system). 
116. See id. (demonstrating the way in which children who are of the same faith as the 
agency are treated differently than children of a different faith). 
117. See Sunnivie Brydum, Texas’ Anti-LGBT Adoption Bill is Unconstitutional and 
Unnecessary, Say Texas Law Professors, RELIGION DISPATCHES (May 23, 2017), http://religion 
dispatches.org/texass-anti-lgbt-adoption-bill-is-unconstitutional-and-unnecessary-say-texas-law-
professors/ [https://perma.cc/25RS-5HCB] (detailing the effects of Texas’s Adoption Bill on 
LGBTQ+ adoptions). 
118. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (protecting child welfare service providers 
from a cause of action for refusing child welfare services to people who do not align with the 
provider’s religious beliefs). 
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including through placing the children in a private or parochial school or 
otherwise providing a religious education in accordance with the laws of 
this state[.]119 
This part of Texas’s Adoption Bill illustrates that the State is indirectly 
funding religious education, not secular education, and potentially 
coercing foster children to believe in certain religious principles.120  
Third, the resulting relationship between the Federal Government and the 
religious authority after the enactment of Texas’s Adoption Bill is quite 
simple—the government is allowing the State to provide services to foster 
children of one faith and not any others.121  Additionally, the government 
is allowing Texas to decline to help LGBTQ+ foster children, foster 
children of no faith, and foster children who believe in faiths which are 
adverse to the faith of the provider.122  Because of this, when aggregating 
all of these effects together, it is apparent there is excessive and 
impermissible government entanglement.123 
In sum, although Texas’s Adoption Bill may survive the first part of 
the Lemon test because its stated legislative purpose appears to be secular, 
it fails the second and third parts of the test and is therefore, an 
unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.124 
2. The Texas Adoption Bill’s “Child Welfare Service Providers” Serve as 
Public Actors Under the Public Function Doctrine  
Texas’s Adoption Bill attempts to mask its unconstitutional funding of 
religion by stating that it is not governmental entities doing the 
 
119. Id. § 45.004(2). 
120. Id.; see Brydum, supra note 117 (explaining the potential coercion minor children may 
experience as a result of religious institutions from Texas’s Adoption Bill). 
121. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (failing to include a definition of 
“sincere religious beliefs” in the definition section). 
122. See id. (ignoring certain groups that will be harmed by the effects of Texas’s Adoption 
Bill and failing to include any protection for these groups). 
123. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614, 649 (finding excessive entanglement between government 
and religion because of the cumulative impact the statutes brought). 
124. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010; see id. at 612–14 (outlining the 
parameters of each element of the test that will determine whether a regulation survives 
constitutional muster).  
18
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 22 [2020], No. 2, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol22/iss2/3
  
2020] CAN WE HAVE OUR CAKE AND EAT IT TOO? 283 
impermissible act, but is private child welfare providers.125  Subsection 
(3) of section 45.002 of the Bill defines “child welfare services providers” 
to be “a person, other than a governmental entity.”126 
“Governmental entity” is further defined in the Bill to include a state 
or municipality, agency of the state or municipality, or “a single source 
continuum contractor in this state.”127  Notably, however, there is 
currently only one single source continuum of care contractor in Texas—
ACH Child and Family Services.128  Typically, the governmental entity 
involved in the adoption process and foster care in Texas is the Texas 
Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS).129  Although 
DFPS would not be able to discriminate under Texas’s Adoption Bill, this 
does not decrease the discrimination Texas’s Adoption Bill entails and 
does not shield Texas from violating the Establishment Clause.130 
In 2017, Texas also passed House Bill 7, which states DFPS cannot 
license individual foster families directly.131  Rather, “child welfare 
providers”—the private entities mentioned in Texas’s Adoption Bill—
will now be responsible for handling all foster family licensing.132  
Therefore, because individuals are required to seek foster licenses from 
these private entities and do not have any other alternatives, they are 
required to face the Texas Adoption Bill’s discrimination.133  
Fundamentally, this should demonstrate how Texas is truly attempting to 
 
125. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.002(3) ( “[A] child welfare service provider’ 
means a person other than a governmental entity . . . .”). 
126. Id.  
127. Id. § 45.002(4). 
128. Texas HB 3859 FAQS, LAMBDA LEGAL (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.lambdalegal.org/ 
hb3859 [https://perma.cc/WS6L-Q7PC]. 
129. See generally Child Protective Services (CPS), TEX. DEP’T OF FAM. & PROTECTIVE 
SERVS., https://www.dfps.state.tx.us [https://perma.cc/5HA9-D49S] (explaining the mission of 
DFPS and its role in child protective services). 
130. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing non-governmental child 
welfare agencies to deny services such as foster care because of the agency’s religious beliefs);  
see also H.B. 7 85th Leg., Reg. Sess.  (Tex. 2017) (denying DFPS, the main governmental child 
service provider, the power to license foster families); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,  
500 U.S. 614, 615 (1991) (explaining how a private actor can begin to act as a public entity); 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (prohibiting excessive entanglement between government and religion). 
131. H.B. 7 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. 65 (Tex. 2017). 
132. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.002(4) (allowing entities that are not 
governmental entities to use religion as a basis to discriminate). 
133. See id. § 45.005 (permitting “child welfare service providers”—not governmental 
entities—to discriminate). 
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shield its public state actions in its Adoption Bill by inaccurately stating 
that only private entities are using religion.134  As such, although Texas’s 
Adoption Bill is only intended to allow private agencies in Texas to 
discriminate, in practice, it is allowing all agencies in Texas to 
discriminate.135 
Because of this consequence, these child welfare service providers are 
exercising a power which is traditionally reserved for the State and are 
therefore, being converted into state actors.136  In Adickes v. S.H. Kress 
& Co., the Supreme Court considered whether a restaurant owner’s 
decision to discriminate on the basis of race was unconstitutional.137  
Because the restaurant owner discriminated under the compulsion of state 
law, the discussion centered on whether the private restaurant owner 
should be categorized as a state actor.138 
The Court ultimately held that the challenging party would be able to 
categorize the private restaurant owner as a state actor so long as his 
discrimination was motivated by a state-enforced custom of segregating 
races in public restaurants.139  In its analysis, the Court specifically 
stated,  “a State is responsible for the discriminatory act of a private party 
when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.”140 
Here, Texas’s Adoption Bill is certainly compelling discriminatory 
acts.141  On the Bill’s face, it seems as though only private companies 
can discriminate, rather than any government or state entity.142  
However, per the public function doctrine, the public entities in the Bill 
are acting as public actors because the entities’ discriminatory acts are 
 
134. See id. § 45.004 (stating that child welfare service providers are protected from adverse 
action in circumstances which conflict with the provider’s sincerely held religious beliefs). 
135. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 639–41 ((O’Connor. J., dissenting) (providing examples 
of when a private actor’s actions can constitute State action)). 
136. See id. at 627–28 (outlining the circumstances that can allow a private actor act as a 
state actor); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 938–39 (1982) (requiring 
“something more” to convert a private party into a “state actor”). 
137. 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970). 
138. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970). 
139. Id. at 171. 
140. Id. at 170. 
141. See id. at 169–70 (converting private actors to state actors if the State compels the 
private actor’s actions); see also TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (demonstrating how the 
State of Texas is compelling private actors to work in a discriminatory manner). 
142. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (allows entities that are not governmental 
entities to use religion as a basis to discriminate). 
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being motivated by a state-enforced law—Texas’s Adoption Bill.143   
The Bill is a law that blatantly states that it will allow all private child 
welfare providers to discriminate against any given person.144 
Thus, under the public function doctrine and Adickes, the “child 
welfare service providers” listed in Texas’s Adoption Bill act as state 
actors and unconstitutionally use State funds as a basis to support 
religion.145  Moreover, these child welfare service providers are being 
encouraged by the State of Texas to continue this discrimination and 
denial of services.146 
3. The Texas Adoption Bill’s Impermissible Government Entanglement is 
Currently Ensuing Litigation in State and Federal Courts 
Impermissible government entanglement is currently being discussed 
in the case of Marouf v. Azar.147  In February 2018, a Texas couple filed 
suit against the Federal Government and a Catholic non-profit 
organization contracted by the government.148  The couple alleged they 
were denied the opportunity to foster two refugee children because they 
did not “mirror the Holy Family.”149  In the complaint, the plaintiffs sued 
the religious organization and the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services—alleging that these entities violated the 
 
143. See id. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing agencies to discriminate against certain individuals 
if the individual carries beliefs that are contrary to the agency’s religious beliefs); see also Lugar, 
457 U.S. at 937 (listing ways through which a private actor can become a state actor). 
144. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005 (failing to provide limitations on who 
agencies can discriminate against). 
145. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (providing a nexus test 
that examines whether a private actor should be considered a State actor); see also 398 U.S. at  
171–75 (asking whether the private actor’s actions were motivated by the State’s customs or laws); 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 476–77 (1953) (“That it was the action in part of the election 
officials charged by Texas law with the fair administration of the primaries, brings it within the 
reach of the law.”); see generally id. §§ 45.001–.010 (providing an example of how a State law can 
compel private actions). 
146. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (permitting private actors to discriminate 
against minorities, unmarried individuals, LGBTQ+ communities, specific faiths, and more);  
see also Adickes, 398 U.S. at 169–71 (focusing on the State’s role in the discriminatory acts). 
147. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Monetary Damages, Marouf 
v. Azar (D.D.C. filed Feb. 20, 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-378) [hereinafter Marouf v. Azar Complaint] 
(providing the grounds for the lawsuit of a same-sex couple in Texas who sued because they were 
denied the opportunity to foster a child due to the religious beliefs of an adoption agency). 
148. Id.  
149. Id. at 14, 21.  
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Constitution because they used religion as a premise to deny federal child 
welfare services.150 
This lawsuit—an example of excessive government entanglement—is 
particularly relevant to the discussion of why Texas’s Adoption Bill 
violates the Constitution’s Establishment Clause.151  In the lawsuit filed 
by Texans, Fatma Marouf and Bryn Esplin, they allege the religious 
organization that turned them down was receiving funding from the 
Department of Health and Human Services and therefore, violative of the 
Constitution’s Establishment Clause.152 
Although the Constitution prohibits such entanglement between 
government and religion, Texas’s Adoption Bill allows for it.153  In any 
given case similar to Marouf, the religious agency can easily point to 
Texas’s Adoption Bill as support for their actions.154  This, in itself, 
illustrates how Texas’s Adoption Bill is violative of the Constitution’s 
Establishment Clause.155 
B. The Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause Does Not Support Texas’s 
Adoption Bill 
In addition to “mak[ing] no law respecting an establishment of 
religion,” the Constitution also states the government shall not 
“prohibit . . . the free exercise of religion.”156  Because of this, the 
Supreme Court has held that the government may neither compel 
 
150. Id. at 3. 
151. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 610 (prohibiting the government from using religion); see also 
id. (illustrating how the government can impermissibly use religion).  
152. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609 (holding that “excessive government entanglement” 
includes using funding for religious reasons); see also Marouf v. Azar Complaint, supra note 147 
at 7–8 (portraying an example of a child welfare agency who received funding from the government 
and subsequently used this funding to support its religious beliefs). 
153. See U.S. CONST. amend I. (prohibiting the establishment of religion in Government); 
see also HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing government agencies—which are funded 
by the taxpayers of Texas—to impermissibly use religion when accepting or denying adoption 
applications). 
154. Marouf v. Azar Complaint, supra note 147 at 10; see TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN.  
§§ 45.001–.010 (failing to require an adoption agency to have a real reason for denying any couple 
the right to foster—so long as the reason is related to a sincerely held religious belief).  
155. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing religion to be used by a 
state actor when deciding who can and cannot adopt or foster a child); see also Lemon, 403 U.S.  
at 610  (prohibiting the entanglement of government and religion).  
156. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
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affirmation of a repugnant belief,157 nor penalize or discriminate against 
individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the 
authorities,158 nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination 
of particular religious groups.159 
In the Congressional Members’ amicus curiae brief, the members 
argued the Masterpiece Cakeshop case brought a unique free exercise 
issue—“an attempt by the government, not to prohibit action motivated 
by religion, but to coerce a message or action that violates the actor’s 
religious conscience.”160  This perspective is also applicable to the case 
at hand because here, in creating Texas’s Adoption Bill, the legislature 
could argue that before the existence of this Bill, agencies were being 
coerced to take actions that were contrary to their religious 
conscience.161 
Several cases have examined this perspective—coercing individuals to 
practice something which is contrary to their religious beliefs.162  For 
example, in Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court examined the “subtle 
coercive pressure” to participate in a public school graduation featuring 
public prayer.163  In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy clarified that 
both of “[t]he First Amendment’s Religion Clauses mean that religious 
beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed 
or prescribed by the State.”164  Thus, when a state seeks to subject 
“freedom of conscience [to] subtle coercive pressure, both religious 
clauses come into play.”165  Consequentially, the Court held the 
graduation ceremony’s procedures violated the First Amendment, even 
 
157. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961). 
158. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69–70 (1953). 
159. Follet v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 582 (1944). 
160. Brief for United States Senators and Representatives as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 31, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1742 
(2018) [hereinafter Congressional Members Amicus Curiae]; see generally Elane Photography, 
LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (illustrating an 
attempt by the government to prohibit action motivated by religion). 
161. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (strengthening adoption agencies’ 
“free exercise of religion” rights by allowing the agencies to use religion as a broad basis for 
denying other individuals their rights). 
162. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (refusing to force a student to 
participate in a school prayer at graduation). 
163. Id. at 588. 
164. Id. at 589. 
165. Id. at 592. 
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though the subtle coercive pressures to attend were applied to all students 
and were both neutral and generally applicable.166 
When applying this analysis to Texas’s Adoption Bill, it is clear that if 
the State attempts to justify the Bill with the Free Exercise Clause, this 
argument will fail.167  First, these child welfare agencies provide 
essential services to children in need and, by providing those services, 
those children are not being coerced into believing any religious 
beliefs.168  This, in itself, is drastically different than an individual being 
forced to pray if they want to attend a graduation ceremony.169 
A student who has worked hard to succeed in school has the desire to 
attend their graduation ceremony at the end of their studies.170  
According to the Free Exercise Clause, the Constitution provides that 
students should not be forced to pray if it is contrary to their own religious 
or secular beliefs.171  Analogously, when a child welfare agency is 
allowing foster parents to adopt a child, the religious views of the agency, 
foster parents, and child are irrelevant.172  Just because an agency of 
Christian faith allows a Muslim couple to adopt a child does not mean the 
Christian agency is now being “coerced” into following a faith contrary 
to their own.173  Coercion involves compulsion by threat or force—
neither of which take place when ordinary adoptions involving multiple 
faiths occur.174  This distinguishes Texas’s Adoption Bill from other free 
 
166. Id. at 588. 
167. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (failing to respect both of the 
religious clauses within the First Amendment). 
168. Compare id. § 45.004 (using “sincere religious beliefs” in a non-religious context), 
with Lee, 505 U.S. at 588–89 (holding that individuals were being coerced into participating in 
prayers at a graduation ceremony). 
169. Compare TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (lacking any text that coerces 
an agency to have the same beliefs as the potential parents of a child), with Lee, 505 U.S. at  
588–89 (describing a situation where students were forced to participate in religious activities). 
170. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 590 (providing a narrative of a student faced with a dilemma of 
not wanting to follow a religious faith while being at school).  
171. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see id. at 599 (stating that a school cannot persuade or compel 
a student to participate in a religious exercise); see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402 (prohibiting the 
Government from penalizing or discriminating against individuals or groups because they hold 
religious views abhorrent to the authorities). 
172. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (lacking any text that coerces an 
agency to have the same beliefs as the potential parents of child). 
173. See id. § 45.005 (allowing an agency to preserve its own beliefs). 
174. See Coerce, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“To compel by force or 
threat”). 
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exercise cases which allow religious refusals because of the risk of 
coercion.175 
The Free Exercise Clause also concerns the longstanding principle that 
one should not have to choose between government benefits and religious 
beliefs—as illustrated in Sherbert v. Verner, McDaniel v. Paty, and 
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer.176   First, in Sherbert, 
the Supreme Court held that an individual should not have a forced choice 
between receiving unemployment benefits and following their faith.177  
Second, in McDaniel, the Court examined a forced choice between public 
office and faith.178  Third, in the recent case of Trinity Lutheran Church 
of Columbia, the Court analyzed the issue of forced choice when a church 
was denied a grant because of its religious affiliation.179  In each of these 
cases, the Court held that it is unconstitutional to require religious 
believers to choose between faith and public participation.180 
When analogizing these cases to Texas’s Adoption Bill, it is apparent 
the Bill also includes the unconstitutional notion of a “forced choice.”181  
Under Texas’s Adoption Bill, potential parents who have religious beliefs 
contrary to that of the agency must choose between a) adopting a child or 
 
175. Compare TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (failing to coerce any agency 
to believe something contrary to their own beliefs), with Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (coercing 
individuals to believe in something contrary to their own beliefs). 
176. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–22 (2017) (holding that a church’s 
rights were violated under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by denying the Church 
an otherwise available public benefit on account of its religious status); 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) 
(holding a clergy-disqualification provision unconstitutional because the State conditioned the 
exercise of religion on the surrender of the ability to hold public office); 374 U.S. at 404 (showing 
that forcing an individual to choose between following the precepts of their religion and forfeiting 
benefits is unconstitutional). 
177. 374 U.S. at 404. 
178. 435 U.S. at 621. 
179. 137 S. Ct. at 2014. 
180. See id. at 2021–22 (holding  that a church cannot be forced to choose between 
participating in a benefit program or remaining a religious institution); McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626 
(holding a clergy-disqualification provision unconstitutional because of the conditions and 
requirements the State imposed); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (detailing how forcing an individual to 
choose between following the precepts of their religion and forfeiting benefits is unconstitutional). 
181. Compare TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (requiring one to choose between 
adopting a child or following their faith), with Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (requiring one to choose 
between receiving unemployment benefits or following their faith). 
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b) following their beliefs.182  This is the same forced choice present in 
Sherbert, McDaniel, and Trinity Lutheran.183 
Additionally, Texas’s Adoption Bill will fail the “neutral and generally 
applicable” test.184  This is important because the Supreme Court has 
held that under the First Amendment, “neutral, generally applicable laws 
may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a 
compelling governmental interest.”185  Although Texas’s Adoption Bill 
may be “neutral,” as it is not targeting a specific faith or favoring a 
specific faith, it is not “generally applicable.”186  The Bill is not 
“generally applicable” because it only targets individuals who express 
religious beliefs or identities contrary to the agencies’ beliefs.187  Thus, 
Texas’s Adoption Bill should not be upheld under any free exercise 
justifications.188 
C. Texas’s Adoption Bill Constitutes Discrimination in Violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause 
Once a right is deemed to be fundamental, courts must respect this right 
and guarantee all individuals are afforded the freedom to exercise that 
right.189  In Shapiro v. Thompson, Justice Brennan concurred with the 
majority opinion stating: 
 
182. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (requiring certain parents to make difficult 
decisions when deciding whether or not to adopt or foster a child).  
183. See 137 S. Ct. at 2021–22 (“The  . . .  policy puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice:  It may 
participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain a religious institution.”); 435 U.S. 
at 626 (holding that under the law, McDaniel “cannot exercise both rights simultaneously because 
the State has conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the other”); 374 U.S. at 404 (“The 
ruling forces her to choose between following the percepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, 
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work.”) . 
184. See generally Burwell, 573 U.S. at 694, 739 (upholding neutral and generally 
applicable laws). 
185. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514. 
186. See id. (requiring laws to be neutral and generally applicable in order to be held as 
constitutional). 
187. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a) (favoring religion rather than neutrality); 
see also id. at 514, 537 (defining a “neutral” law to neither approve nor disapprove of religion). 
188. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537 (describing that just as an individual must comply 
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability that proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his 
religion prescribes (or proscribes), so must a state bill). 
189. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 620 
(1969) (expounding the need to respect fundamental rights to all citizens). 
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[t]he Court today does not “pick out particular human activities, 
characterize them as ‘fundamental,’ and give them added protection . . .” 
To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established 
constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the 
Constitution itself demands.190 
In an equal protection analysis, the first question is whether the 
applicable law operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class or impinges 
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the 
Constitution.191  If the law does not, then the inquiry ends there.192  
However, if the law does impinge upon a fundamental right, then a 
reviewing court must determine whether the law furthers a legitimate, 
articulated purpose.193 
1. Texas’s Adoption Bill Impinges Upon Numerous Fundamental Rights 
and Therefore Does Not Trigger the Lenient Rational Basis Review 
In the context of Texas’s Adoption Bill, we must apply the first prong 
of the test by asking whether this Bill operates to the disadvantage of a 
suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right that is explicitly or 
implicitly protected by the Constitution.194  This first prong itself 
consists of two parts: the first focusing on the “suspect class” and the 
second focusing on the deprivation of a fundamental right.195  The first 
part has common ground in Supreme Court precedent.196  In San Antonio 
 
190. 394 U.S. at 620. 
191. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
192. Id.  
193. Id. 
194. Id.  
195. Id.  
196. See id. at 20–22 (providing examples of “suspect classes” in equal protection 
jurisprudence); see also, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (striking a Texas filing-
fee requirement in primary elections because it barred potential candidates who were unable to pay 
the fee); Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228 (1971) (striking a law that did not provide 
indigent prisoners with the basic rights of an adequate defense or appeal); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 
395, 397–98 (1971) (invalidating a law imposing criminal penalties on indigents who could not pay 
a fine); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243–44 (1970) (striking down criminal penalties that 
placed indigents in prison because of their inability to pay a monetary fine); Gardner v. California, 
393 U.S. 367, 370–71 (1969) (holding that a law which denied a transcript of a hearing to an 
indigent to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,  
357–58 (1963) (invalidating a law that denied counsel on appeal to an indigent defendant); Draper 
v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499–500 (1963) (refuting a law that denied the indigent a transcript 
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Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court mentioned that the 
individuals who are typically discriminated against in equal protection 
cases typically share two specific characteristics: 
because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some 
desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute 
deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.197 
Here, both characteristics are met.198  In Rodriguez,  the Court 
examined these characteristics in determining whether an equal 
protection violation occurred in a suit where parents sued on behalf of 
their minority-grouped school children in Texas.199  The parents argued 
their children were not provided with equal protection of the laws because 
they were not receiving the same educational opportunities that other 
children in Texas were receiving, as their low-property taxes 
inadequately funded the schools.200  Because of this, the parents argued 
the Texas school finance system was unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.201   
In the end, the Court held that the Texas system did not operate to the 
particular disadvantage of any suspect class.202  Additionally, the Court 
held education was not a fundamental right or liberty.203  Because no 
fundamental right was involved, the Court instead used a rational basis 
test, rather than strict scrutiny, and ultimately held that Texas’s school 
financing system does have a rational relationship to some legitimate 
state purpose.204  Therefore, the system was found to be 
constitutional.205 
 
to their hearing); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (striking state laws that prevented an 
indigent defendant from receiving a transcript during his trial and appeal process). 
197. 411 U.S. at 20. 
198. Id. at 17 (providing two common characteristics that typical “suspect classes” have in 
equal protection analysis). 
199. Id.  
200. See id. at 4–6, 8 (describing the issue of whether the Texas school finance system 
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class). 
201. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend XIV (requiring states to provide equal protection of the 
law to all citizens). 
202. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 54–55. 
203. Id. at 35, 37. 
204. Id. at 55. 
205. Id.  
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Unlike Rodriguez, Texas’s Adoption Bill infringes upon a fundamental 
right.206 Highlighting this fact emphasizes the unconstitutionality of 
Texas’s Adoption Bill.207  This distinction affects the validity of the law 
because it establishes the standard which will be used to determine the 
constitutionality of the law.208   
When non-fundamental rights are at stake, like in Rodriguez, a rational 
basis test applies.209  Under a rational basis analysis, the law in dispute 
will almost always be constitutional.210  This lenient test demonstrates 
“[a] statutory discrimination . . . [will not] be set aside if any state of facts 
reasonably may be conceived [by the Court] to justify it.”211  Conversely, 
as explored in more detail below, when the Court applies a strict scrutiny 
test, the challenged law is presumed to be invalid.212 
2. Texas’s Adoption Bill Does Not Survive Strict Scrutiny 
A strict scrutiny test diametrically opposes rational basis review—as 
statutes rarely survive the test.213  A law can only survive strict scrutiny 
if it is narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate government objective.214  
Here, because Texas’s Adoption Bill infringes upon a fundamental right 
 
206. See id. at 33 (evaluating the constitutionality of a regulation that affected the non-
fundamental right to bear arms in the public sphere). 
207. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n.51 
(1977) (reiterating the right to adopt as equivalent to the fundamental right of biological parents); 
compare id. at 35 (dealing with a non-fundamental right) (emphasis added), with TEX. HUM. RES. 
CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (describing a proposed bill noticeably infringing upon individuals’ 
fundamental right to adopt). 
208. Compare Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446–47 (1972) (requiring a rational basis 
test to be used for non-fundamental rights), with Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375–76 
(1971) (requiring strict scrutiny to be used for fundamental rights).  
209. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–320 (1993) (requiring a rational basis standard 
of review to be used when non-fundamental rights are being triggered); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447 
n.7 (reiterating the need for a lenient rational basis test when non-fundamental rights are being 
examined). 
210. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319–20 (reflecting the presumption a law will be constitutional 
under a rational basis analysis); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 54–55 (finding Texas’s 
school financing system to be constitutional because there was some rational relationship to a 
legitimate State purpose). 
211. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). 
212. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 61 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
213. See id. at 16–17 (reflecting on the presumption of invalidity that statutes will have 
when going through a strict scrutiny analysis); see also Heller, 509 U.S. at 319–20 (describing the 
presumption of validity under rational basis review).  
214. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 16–17.  
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rather than a non-fundamental right, strict scrutiny will be used rather 
than rational basis.215  For example, strict scrutiny was used in 
fundamental right cases dealing with privacy.216  In those cases, the 
Court recognized the right to privacy to be a fundamental right; thus, any 
possible infringement upon that right required a rigid strict scrutiny 
analysis.217 
The only time a rational basis test is applicable is when non-
fundamental rights are in dispute.218  In Rodriguez, the Court was clear 
to hold that the right to education was not a fundamental right, which is 
what led the Court to use rational basis rather than strict scrutiny.219  This 
distinction is crucial for the equal protection analysis for Texas’s 
Adoption Bill because the applicable test will determine the outcome of 
the Bill’s constitutionality.220 
Because the right to adoption is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny 
must be applied.221  Adoption is a fundamental right and “the legal 
equivalent of biological parenthood.”222  Therefore, any law which 
creates categorical barriers based on criteria such as the potential adoptive 
parent’s marital status, sexual orientation, age, religion, race, or ethnicity 
is presumptively unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny approach.223  
 
215. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53, 155–56, 170 (1973) (using a strict scrutiny 
standard when a fundamental right was involved). 
216. See, e.g., id. (using a strict scrutiny test to determine whether an abortion law was 
constitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding a law within the zone 
of privacy must withstand strict scrutiny); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (using 
strict scrutiny in a fundamental right case on privacy). 
217. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53, 155–56, 170; see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (holding a law 
concerning the zone of privacy must stand against strict scrutiny); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541  
(“[It is the Court’s] view that strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a  
sterilization law is essential.”). 
218. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319–20 (understanding fundamental rights of the mentally 
challenged); see, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 17, 35, 40 (using a rational basis 
test because there is no fundamental right to education). 
219. 411 U.S. at 35, 37, 40. 
220. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005 (2017) (involving fundamental rights such 
as: the right to adopt, the right to raise your family as you see fit, the right to privacy); see also id. 
at 16–17 (providing the applicable test for constitutional challenges when fundamental rights are at 
stake).  
221. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 843–44 (holding that adoption is a fundamental right); see also 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (requiring a strict scrutiny test when evaluating fundamental rights). 
222. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844.  
223. See id. (stating that adoption is a fundamental right). 
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Restrictive laws—such as Texas’s Adoption Bill—must be given the 
same strict scrutiny and examination of means and ends as other laws 
which place categorical burdens on entry into and recognition of 
fundamental family relationships.224 
 Strict scrutiny requires the law to be the least restrictive means to meet 
a compelling governmental interest.225  Moreover, this test has been 
known as the “most rigorous and exacting standard of constitutional 
review.”226  When applying this standard to Texas’s Adoption Bill, it is 
clear it does not survive constitutional muster.227 
First, there is no indicated “compelling governmental interest.”228  As 
mentioned above, the “purpose” listed in Texas’s Adoption Bill is to 
“promote diversity and inclusion.”229  However, the actual terms of the 
Bill do not achieve this purpose and therefore, this cannot be a compelling 
governmental interest.230  If there were any actual “governmental 
interests” for this Bill, it would contain something along the lines of 
promoting religion—which is clearly unconstitutional.231  Second, even 
if the State did assert a compelling governmental interest for enacting 
Texas’s Adoption Bill, the procedures in the Bill are certainly not 
narrowly tailored nor the “least restrictive means” of achieving any 
 
224. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.004–.005 (2017) (allowing child welfare 
services providers to discriminate against same-sex couples due to the services’ sincerely held 
religious beliefs); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (describing the way in 
which laws that trigger fundamental rights rarely survive constitutional muster). 
225. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 385–86 (stating that regulations regarding fundamental rights 
can be imposed so long as they are the least restrictive for that fundamental right). 
226. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (noting that, 
when strict scrutiny applies, legislation is presumptively invalid); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (detailing the constitutionality of electoral redistricting). 
227. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (2017) (taking a highly burdensome 
approach in allegedly attempting to achieve a state interest); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 
(requiring laws that trigger fundamental rights to be the least restrictive means in achieving a state 
interest).  
228. See generally TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.001 (2017) (lacking any compelling 
governmental interest in its purpose). 
229. Id.  
230. See id. §§ 45.001–.010 (stating its purpose of the Bill to be “diversity and inclusion”); 
see also TEX. DEP’T OF FAM. & PROTECTIVE SERVS., supra note 129 (stating that nearly half a 
million children live in foster care in the United States). 
231. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (indicating that “excessive government entanglement” 
with religion is unconstitutional). 
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governmental purpose.232  Therefore, Texas’s Adoption Bill cannot 
survive constitutional muster and must be stricken as unconstitutional.233 
In addition to not surviving strict scrutiny, the “common 
characteristics” test, which Justice Powell mentioned in the Rodriguez 
decision, further emphasizes the unconstitutionality of Texas’s Adoption 
Bill.234  These two common characteristics are 1) “because of their 
impecunity, [class members are] . . . completely unable to pay for some 
desired benefit,” and because of this, 2) “they sustained an absolute 
deprivation of meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.”235  Here, 
the “suspect class” is the group of individuals who are now not able to 
practice their fundamental right to adopt.236   
In Rodriguez, the Court defined the “typical indicia of 
suspectness.”237  The typical classification is “saddled with such 
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.”238  Here, the most obvious group of individuals who will be 
harmed by Texas’s Adoption Bill is the LGBTQ+ community.239  
However, this is not to say that the Bill’s harm is limited to these 
individuals.240  Yet, it is clear many faith-based adoption agencies will 
have “sincerely held religious beliefs” that do not coincide with the 
LGBTQ+ communities’ beliefs.241 
 
232. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.009(d) (taking a highly burdensome approach 
that infringes on numerous individual rights).  
233. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (requiring a regulation or law to pass strict scrutiny in 
order for it to be held as constitutional). 
234. See 411 U.S. at 20 (defining two common characteristics that all suspect classes in 
equal protection cases have in common). 
235. Id.  
236. Cf. id. at 28 (defining what the traditional “suspect class” typically is). 
237. Id.  
238. Id.  
239. See Marouf v. Azar Complaint, supra note 147 at 15 (providing an example of how the 
LGBTQ+ community is affected by Texas’s Adoption Bill). 
240. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing discrimination against any 
group under a “religious exception”). 
241. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1723 (illustrating a situation where 
an individual used his religious beliefs to refuse to bake a cake for a LGBTQ+ couple); see also 
Elane Photography, LLC, 309 P.3d at 53 (denying photography services to an LGBTQ+ couple 
because of religious beliefs). 
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III.    THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEXAS’S ADOPTION BILL 
AND MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP 
As mentioned earlier, after the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision, many 
conservatives praised the ruling and saw it as a victory for religious 
refusals.242  Certain parties interpreted the case to expand religious 
protections and allow businesses to use their religious beliefs to deny 
services to individuals.243  However, the analysis of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop reveals that the decision does not support religious refusals in 
all contexts—and specifically does not support the constitutionality of 
religiously infused laws such as Texas’s Adoption Bill.244 
A. Although Designing a Wedding Cake May be Protected First 
Amendment Speech, Denying Services to Foster Children is Not 
Protected Speech 
In deciding Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court focused on several 
crucial factors such as Baker Phillips’ mastery at designing cakes and 
how he considered his cakes to be protected speech under the First 
Amendment.245  Because his speech was considered to be his art, it was 
protected—allowing him to decline to create his art for whomever he 
wished.246 
In fact, leading up to the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision, several 
United States Senators and Representatives submitted an amicus curiae 
 
242. See 138 S. Ct. at 1723 (arguing the Baker’s decision was an exercise of his freedom of 
speech and freedom of religion); see also Senator Cruz Statement, supra note 6 (claiming the 
Court’s decision denied an oppressive bureaucracy the opportunity to trample religious liberty). 
243. See Senator Cruz Statement, supra note 6 (“The decision’s wide 7–2 margin shows 
that the justices recognize what millions of Americans have known since the first Constitutional 
Convention: whether a baker, a teacher, a doctor, or clergy, the government may not force any 
Americans to violate his sincerely held religious beliefs.”); see also Todd Ruger, Lawmakers Add 
to the Mix in the Same-Sex Wedding Cake Case, ROLL CALL (Dec. 5, 2017, 5:01 AM), 
https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/same-sex-wedding-cake [https://perma.cc/8PVR-QE8E] 
(explaining the political views on Masterpiece Cakeshop prior to its ruling). 
244. See Emma Platoff, What the U.S. Supreme Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision 
Means for Religious Refusal Laws in Texas, TEX. TRIB. (June 5, 2018, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/05/us-supreme-court-masterpiece-cakeshop-gay-ruling-
religious-freedom-tex/ [https://perma.cc/4SVE-X4BA] (describing the potential chilling and 
discriminatory effects that the Masterpiece Cakeshop holding could have on Texas). 
245. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1728. 
246. Id.  
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brief on this issue.247  In the brief, the Senators focused on the Free 
Speech component and argued “Phillips’ artistry on a celebratory custom 
wedding cake is protected First Amendment speech.”248  Because 
Phillips’ speech is protected, the Senators argued strict scrutiny should 
apply, and Colorado’s restrictions of Phillips’ speech fails under this 
standard.249 
When determining whether conduct is considered “protected speech” 
under the First Amendment, the first inquiry is whether the conduct is 
expressive.250  Courts determine whether conduct is expressive by 
examining whether the speech is “intended to be communicative” or “in 
context, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be 
communicative.”251  If the speech is expressive, then the Constitution 
protects it by limiting the government’s authority to restrict or compel 
it.252 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the petitioners argued that Phillips’ creation 
of custom wedding cakes for individuals was expressive.253  The Court 
agreed with the petitioners’ contention and held that Phillips expressed 
himself by creating and designing custom wedding cakes.254  Because 
Phillips’ cakes were considered art, Colorado’s public accommodations 
law was “alter[ing] the expressive content” of his message, as it forced 
him to create custom wedding cakes for same-sex weddings.255  The 
 
247. See Congressional Members Amicus Curiae, supra note 160 at 31 (arguing that the 
Government is trying to “coerce a message or action that violates the actor’s religious conscience”).  
248. Id. at 7. 
249. Id. at 23. 
250. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (“Expression, 
whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner 
restrictions.”). 
251. Id. at 294. 
252. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1742. 
253. See id. (detailing the reasons why Baker Phillips was considered an “artist” and his 
cakes were his “art”). 
254. Compare id. at 1743 (providing that “the use of his artistic talents to create a well-
recognized symbol that celebrates the beginning of a marriage” is protected speech), with Barnes 
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) (holding nude dancing to be unprotected 
speech), and Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (reasoning the display of red flags 
as an opposition to government to be unprotected speech). 
255. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1743–44; see COLO REV. STAT.  
§ 24-34-601 (2014) (prohibiting discrimination in a wide range of public spaces).  But see Hurley 
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995) (deciding 
“provisions like these . . . [to be] well within the State’s usual power to enact when a legislature 
34
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Court ended its analysis by reiterating “[t]he meaning of expressive 
conduct . . . depends on ‘the context in which it occur[s].’”256 
In the context of Texas’s Adoption Bill, the religious refusal analysis 
will differ greatly from the Masterpiece Cakeshop analysis.257  In 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Phillips’ speech was protected because his cakes 
were a form of expression and because he was selling them as goods to 
other individuals.258  However, Texas’s Adoption Bill does not deal with 
selling goods or services and does not deal with freedom of expression in 
any shape or form.259  Rather, it deals with foster children in need of 
homes, couples seeking to adopt children, agencies being able to deny 
these potential parents their right to adopt, and agencies denying the 
foster children an adequate home.260 
B. Purchasing Cakes is Not a Fundamental Right, but Freedom of 
Personal Choice in Matters of Marriage and Family Life is  
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, when the same-sex couple was denied a 
wedding cake, they were not deprived of a fundamental right.261  If the 
baker’s decision barred them from getting married, then the couple would 
have been deprived of a fundamental right; however, that was not the 
case.262  David Mullins and Charlie Craig were still able to get married 
if they desired to—they were just required to purchase the cake from a 
different baker.263  Thus, in the end, they were not deprived of a 
“fundamental right,” which is part of the reasoning behind the Court’s 
decision to ultimately permit the baker’s conduct.264 
 
has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, as they do not, as a general 
matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments”).  
256. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1744. 
257. Compare id. at 1727–28 (examining religious refusals in the context of selling goods 
and services), with TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005 (allowing religious refusals in the context 
of providing homes to foster children in need). 
258. 138 S. Ct. at 1742. 
259. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a). 
260. See id. (permitting religious refusals by non-governmental agencies in the context of 
providing homes to foster children in need). 
261. See 138 S. Ct. at 1724 (denying the couple the opportunity to purchase a cake).   
262. Id.; see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (holding same-sex couples 
have a fundamental right to marry). 
263. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1724. 
264. Id.  
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The circumstances surrounding Texas’s Adoption Bill are quite 
different.265  For one, certain classes of individuals will be deprived of a 
fundamental right—the right to have freedom of personal choice in 
matters of marriage and family life.266  This discussion began in 1923 in 
Meyer v. Nebraska when the Court declared: 
Without doubt, [constitutionally protected liberty] denotes not merely 
freedom from bodily restrain but also the right of the individual . . . to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . and generally to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.267 
After this case, the Supreme Court continued to examine the extent of 
fundamental rights with regard to marriage and children.268  This 
examination soon led to the modern adaptation of the right to privacy.269  
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court struck down a state ban 
on the use of contraceptives because of “the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marriage relationship.”270  This expanding right to 
privacy brought a new set of fundamental freedoms:271 the right to 
 
265. Compare id. at 1732 (allowing a baker to refuse to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding 
celebration), with TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a) (allowing adoption agencies to refuse 
to allow particular classes of individuals to adopt children). 
266. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a) (permitting agencies to refuse to provide 
services to certain classes of individuals); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 
539–40 (1977) (declaring freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life to be 
an implicit fundamental right); Ashe McGovern, Texas House Passes Bill Allowing Adoption 
Agencies to Turn Away Same-Sex Couples, SLATE: OUTWARD (May 10, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/05/10/texas_house_passes_bill_letting_adoption_agen
cies_turn_away_same_sex_couples.html [https://perma.cc/RT9W-MGDF] (providing potential 
harmful consequences of Texas’s Adoption Bill). 
267. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
268. See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race.”); see generally Joseph A. Pull, Questioning the 
Fundamental Right to Marry, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 24–33 (2006) (exploring the parameters of 
non-textual constitutional protection for marriage).  
269. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (granting married individuals a constitutional right 
to prevent conception). 
270. Id.  
271. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 498–99 (finding an ordinance to violate constitutional 
due process protections because it intruded upon family sanctity); Smith, 431 U.S. at 845 (“The 
individual’s freedom to marry and reproduce is ‘older than the Bill of Rights.’” (citing Griswold, 
381 U.S. at 486)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“[T]his Court 
has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one 
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Roe, 410 
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marry,272 to procreate,273 to avoid procreation,274 to rear children,275 
and to cohabit with family members.276 
Included in these “family privacy” rights should be the right to 
adoption.277  Although many recent cases examine these familial rights, 
the origins of these rights stem from early 1920s cases.278  The Court’s 
emphasis on familial rights throughout history until present day further 
emphasizes the fact that no individual should be deprived of this right.279  
Similar to the right to marriage and the right to privacy, adoption is a 
fundamental right.280  The Court has held that adoption is “the legal 
equivalent of biological parenthood” and has also held that a child has a 
fundamental right to basic family relationships.281 
It is important to note the broad range of familial relationships which 
Texas’s Adoption Bill affects.282  As discussed throughout this 
Comment, Texas’s Adoption Bill permits Texas child welfare service 
programs to refuse services to certain individuals.283  Notably, Section 
45.002 of the Adoption Bill itself defines “child welfare services” to 
mean: 
 
U.S. at 152–53 (“Only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty’ are included in this guarantee of personal privacy . . . [This personal privacy] 
right has some extension to activities relation to marriage.” (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 325 (1937)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (declaring 
marriage to be a constitutional liberty protected by the Due Process Clause). 
272. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384–85; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
273. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541–42. 
274. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 
(1992) (“[T]he Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s most basic 
decisions about family and parenthood.”); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (listing factors women 
may consider when deciding to continue their pregnancy); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (extending 
privacy rights to protect access to contraceptives). 
275. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (acknowledging that “the rights to 
conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed “essential”). 
276. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–06. 
277. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844. 
278. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the Court could 
not prevent a child from attending a private school); see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397 (holding that 
the Court could not prevent children from learning a foreign language). 
279. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 842. 
280. Id. at 844. 
281. Id. at 844 n. 51. 
282. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (providing broad definitions for the 
term “child welfare providers”). 
283. Id. § 45.005. 
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social services provided to or on behalf of children, including: A) assisting 
abused or neglected children; B) counseling children or parents; C) 
promoting foster parenting; D) providing foster homes, general residential 
operations, residential care, adoptive homes, group homes, or temporary 
group shelters for children; E) recruiting foster parents; F) placing children 
in foster homes; G) licensing foster homes; H) promoting adoption or 
recruiting adoptive parents; I) assisting adoptions or supporting adoptive 
families; J) performing or assisting home studies; K) assisting kinship 
guardianships or kinship caregivers; L) providing family preservation 
services; M) providing family support services; N) providing temporary 
family reunification services; O) placing children in adoptive homes; and 
P) serving as a foster parent.284 
 The length and breadth of this list illustrates the wide range of familial 
relationships that Texas’s House Bill disturbs.285  This list also signifies 
the broad range of constitutional violations that follow with the Bill.286  
Further, the list demonstrates how the Bill’s usage of “child welfare 
services” does not only cover services provided to children—therefore, 
expanding the types of providers that can utilize this law to discriminate 
without receiving adverse action.287 
Therefore, Texas’s Adoption Bill places a wide array of fundamental 
rights at stake.288  Because of this, if the Supreme Court were to examine 
the constitutionality of Texas’s Adoption Bill today, it would take a very 
different approach than it did in Masterpiece Cakeshop.289  First, it 
would certainly use a strict scrutiny analysis.290  As discussed in the 
 
284. Id. § 45.002(3). 
285. See id. §§ 45.001–.010 (providing a laundry list of familial services that Texas’s 
Adoption Bill will affect); cf. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844 (holding that an individual has a fundamental 
right to basic family relationships). 
286. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (discriminating in many aspects of 
familial relationships); cf. Smith, 431 U.S. at 843 (recognizing the family as being of foundational 
importance to our society). 
287. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (affecting both children and potential 
parents’ fundamental rights).  
288. See id. (exposing numerous vulnerable communities to discrimination); see also Smith, 
431 U.S. at 842 (emphasizing the importance of familial relationships and the fundamental rights 
placed within these relationships).  
289. See 138 S. Ct. at 1728 (providing a narrow and specific solution to the baker and same-
sex couple under a Free Speech analysis). 
290. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (violating individuals’ fundamental 
rights); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53 (requiring strict scrutiny to be used anytime a fundamental 
right is triggered). 
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equal protection analysis above, strict scrutiny is the appropriate test in 
cases involving fundamental rights.291  Here, the fundamental rights of 
adoption, privacy, marriage, freedom to raise a family as you deem fit, 
and more are triggered in Texas’s Adoption Bill.292 
This Comment previously demonstrated how Texas’s Adoption Bill 
will not survive a strict scrutiny test because it is not the least restrictive 
way the State can achieve any compelling governmental interest.293  It is 
important to reiterate this point when comparing the breadth of rights that 
Texas’s Adoption Bill reaches in comparison to the constitutional 
violations involved in Masterpiece Cakeshop.294  While Masterpiece 
Cakeshop extends protections to the discriminatory behavior of 
individual business owners, Texas’s Adoption Bill subjects thousands of 
potential parents, children, and families to the personally held religious 
views of government employees and agents.295  Therefore, the narrow 
holding in Masterpiece Cakeshop cannot be interpreted as support for 
laws which allow religious belief-based refusals, laws such as Texas’s 
Adoption Bill.296 
C. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Supreme Court Relies on Precedent 
Similar Facts to Texas’s Adoption Bill When Coming to its 
Conclusion 
Notably, in the Masterpiece Cakeshop analysis, the Court cited an 
established case that examined the clash between religious beliefs and 
 
291. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 17 (imposing the rigorous strict scrutiny 
test on any regulation or law that burdens a fundamental right).  
292. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (targeting a wide array of 
fundamental rights).  
293. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (defining the specifics of a strict scrutiny analysis). 
294. Compare 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24 (denying David Mullins and Charlie Craig the 
opportunity to purchase a wedding cake from Baker Jack Phillips in Colorado), with TEX. HUM. 
RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (denying any potential parent or child any type of child welfare 
service from private agencies in Texas). 
295. Compare TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing adoption agencies in 
Texas to discriminate against anyone who wants to adopt or foster a child), with 138 S. Ct. at 1727 
(allowing business owners to refuse to bake a cake or create art).   
296. See 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (“The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must 
await further elaboration in the courts . . . recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with 
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons 
to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.”). 
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discriminatory conduct.297  While the Court emphasized the importance 
of the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause in its analysis of the issues, it 
also stated: 
Nevertheless, while those religious and philosophical objections are 
protected, it is a general rule that such objections do not allow business 
owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected 
persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally 
applicable public accommodation law.298 
When making this statement, the Court cited the well-known case of 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.299  In Newman, the Supreme 
Court upheld the Fourth Circuit ruling that five South Carolina barbecue 
chain restaurants violated the public accommodations law in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1961 by refusing to serve African American customers.300  
The district court in Newman stated that it “refuse[d] to lend credence or 
support to [the defendant’s] position that he has a constitutional right to 
refuse to serve members of the Negro race in his business establishments 
upon the ground that to do so would violate his sacred religious 
beliefs.”301  
In Justice Winter’s concurrence, he agreed with the district court and 
stated that the defendant should be subject to sanctions for the frivolous 
nature of such an argument in the face of overwhelming jurisprudence 
which supported the Civil Rights Act overcoming such a claim.302    Just 
as the plaintiffs in Newman had a public accommodation law to protect 
them from discrimination,303 those discriminated against because of the 
Texas’s Adoption Bill have a similar basis for protection—the United 
States Constitution.  
 
297. Compare id. at 1727 (citing precedent relating to a business owner’s desire to deny 
services to a group of individuals because of his religious beliefs), with TEX. HUM. RES. CODE 
ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing child welfare services to deny services to certain individuals 
because of the agencies religious beliefs). 
298. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
299. Id. (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per 
curiam)). 
300. 377 F.2d 433, 434 (1967). 
301. 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (1966). 
302. Newman, 377 F.2d at 438. 
303. Id. at 434. 
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The fact that the Supreme Court cited this case fifty years later, in 
another case which presented a very similar situation, shows that the 
Supreme Court was cognizant of the harms  religious refusals bring.304  
The Court was cautious in holding a baker could refuse to bake a cake for 
a same-sex couple, but the Court did not characterize this as a “religious 
refusal” or undermine constitutional grounds that separate religion from 
law.305 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has left a gray area for religious refusals.306  In 
contexts such as Texas’s Adoption Bill—where First Amendment free 
exercise rights are so vigorously protected they cause discrimination—
this grey area is largely apparent.307  Although many interpreted 
Masterpiece Cakeshop as a victory for religious refusals, it is not.308  The 
decision provided a narrow holding which essentially reiterated Free 
Speech principles in the context of designing a cake for a same-sex couple 
in Colorado.309  Now, however, the Supreme Court is at a point where it 
needs to clarify the untouched parts of the Masterpiece Cakeshop 
case.310  Until the Supreme Court ultimately decides these specific issues 
of discrimination, all that is clear is the unconstitutionality of religiously 
 
304. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (concluding with the importance 
of judicial neutrality, tolerance, and respect when resolving discrimination disputes).   
305. See id. (holding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not exercise its power 
“with the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires”). 
306. See e.g., id. at 1727–29, 1732 (acknowledging the discrimination the baker exercised 
against the same-sex couple and upholding the legality of anti-discrimination public 
accommodation laws; but allowing the baker’s actions to go unpunished due to the religiously 
“unneutral” manner in which the State handled the case). 
307. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (attempting to allow child welfare 
agencies to practice their free exercise rights); see also Marouf v. Azar Complaint, supra note 147 
at 3 (providing an example of a same-sex couple who were harmed by the effects of Texas’s 
Adoption Bill). 
308. See Rodney W. Harrell, State Religious Free-Exercise Defenses to Nondiscrimination 
Laws: Still Relevant After Masterpiece Cakeshop, 87 UMKC L. REV. 297, 314–15 (2019) 
(elaborating on the narrow holding of the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision and describing how it 
was unintended to support religious refusals). 
309. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
310. See id. (“Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples 
cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.”). 
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infused laws such as Texas’s Adoption Bill.311  Texas’s Adoption Bill is 
highly distinguishable from religious refusal incidents such as 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and is violative of both the Establishment Clause 
and Equal Protection Clause.312  As such, Texas’s Adoption Bill should 
be stricken as unconstitutional.313 
 
311. See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (allowing sincerely held 
religious beliefs to infringe on the Constitutionally protected rights of others); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§§ 26-6-36–48 (2017) (allowing child-placement agencies to deny services based on a “sincerely-
held religious belief or moral conviction” and protecting child-placement agencies from religious 
discrimination by the State but not providing prospective parents or the children with the same 
discriminatory protection); Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination 
Act, Ch. 334, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-62-1–19 (2019) (legitimizing and allowing religious 
organization, parties to foster care, medical providers, commercial sales and service entities, and  
government employees to discriminate based on three religious beliefs or moral convictions:  
1) marriage is only between a man and a woman; 2) sexual relations are reserved to marriage; and  
3) gender is determined at birth and is immutable). 
312. Compare TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (reaching beyond the typical 
free exercise protections and in turn violating numerous constitutional rights of private citizens who 
are involved in the Texas foster care system), with 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (holding that private business 
owners accused of discrimination in violation with public accommodation laws are “entitled to a 
neutral decisionmaker who [will] give full and fair consideration to [the accused] religious 
objection”). 
313. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.001–.010 (infringing on numerous fundamental 
rights of vulnerable communities throughout Texas).  
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